Stoicism and Modern Ethics
Chapter 6 of Chris Gill's Learning to Live Naturally
In the first two parts of Chris Gill’s far-reaching new book, Learning to Live Naturally (which we’ve covered over the past 8 weeks), the focus has been on analyzing ancient Stoicism. We’ve worked toward understanding exactly what the Stoics mean by “living in agreement with nature,” or why they would say that virtue is necessary and sufficient for happiness, or how they could maintain that bad emotions are based on faulty judgment. We’ve made excellent progress in our understanding of Stoic theory.
In Part III, the focus shifts: we are now interested in applying these timeless Stoic ideas to contemporary ethical theory. This is a crucial step for Stoicism to be included as part of the current philosophical conversation. Even though many of us here believe the ancient Stoics mostly got things right, we have to acknowledge that a lot has happened in philosophy over the past 2,000 years. We need to explain how Stoicism fits into the current philosophical landscape and what it can contribute over and above other philosophies.
That’s exactly what Gill aims to do in Chapter 6 of Learning to Live Naturally. As he puts it, the intention “is to give Stoic ethics more of a voice, as a contributor or challenger in current debates in moral philosophy, than it has at present” (p. 250). To this end, Gill briefly reviews the revival of virtue ethics in the 20th century, with a special focus on the Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics that is most closely related to Stoicism. He then explains how Stoicism, as a more coherent and rigorous moral system than Aristotle’s, can address some of the shortcomings of Aristotelian virtue ethics as it’s commonly understood today.
How Stoicism Fits into Modern Ethics
For readers who are not familiar with academic philosophy, I want to provide a very brief overview of the three contemporary approaches to ethics favored by recent theorists. Each of these approaches has a different system for helping people decide how to act, especially in difficult cases where ethical answers are not clear-cut:
Deontology: tries to break down ethical action into rules; its most famous example is Kant’s categorical imperative, “Act only according to that maxim by which you can also will that it would become a universal law”
Consequentialism: advocates deciding what to do based on what the consequences of your actions will be; its most famous branch is Utilitarianism, which aims for the greatest good to the greatest number of people
Virtue ethics: recommends action based on virtue, which may be seen as a skill or disposition; contemporary virtue ethics is primarily based on the work of Aristotle
So deontology focuses duties and rules, consequentialism focuses on the outcome, and virtue ethics focuses on character. Of these three categories, Stoicism obviously fits into virtue ethics. The problem, though, is that these days academic virtue ethics is primarily dominated by Aristotle. (It’s important to specify academic virtue ethics here, because outside of universities Stoicism is quite popular and few people have heard of Aristotelianism.) Because Aristotle was so influential in Western philosophy for so many centuries, the recent revival of interest in virtue ethics was centered on his work.
Now don’t get me wrong, Aristotle was quite brilliant. In a couple of weeks I’ll be publishing a review of John Sellars’ new book on him, where we’ll be taking some time to appreciate his genius. But unfortunately, Aristotle’s system of ethics has some serious flaws. Since 21st century philosophers for the most part equate virtue ethics with Aristotelian virtue ethics, many of them see the flaws of Aristotelianism as just the flaws of virtue ethics. It’s easy to write off virtue ethics altogether by poking holes in Aristotle’s arguments and exposing the inconsistencies within his surviving writings.
For this reason, Gill puts forward Stoicism as a superior approach to virtue ethics, conceived along the same lines as Aristotle’s but much more systematic, internally consistent, and psychologically credible:
In a whole series of ways, the Stoic ethical framework is more fully worked out, more systematic in conception and presentation, and more consistent. This point applies to the key concepts, including virtue and happiness (the goal of life), and their interrelationship. Aristotle’s framework, for instance, as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics, is more provisional or exploratory, with a number of loose ends, ambiguities and internal tensions or inconsistencies, on quite major points. This difference comes out, for instance, in their treatments of virtue, happiness, and the contribution of other valuable things, and of the relationship between practical and theoretical forms of virtue and happiness...
Stoic ethics, by contrast, though also operating within the same Aristotelian framework, offers more fully worked out and consistent positions on these and related topics. In this respect, Stoic ethics can be more helpful for modern virtue theorists.
p. 255
There are several reasons for the inconsistencies we find in Aristotle’s writings, Gill suggests. One is simply that his “works” are probably just lecture notes, not meant to be presented as a finished product with all the details worked out. Another is that Aristotle tried to have his cake and eat it too: while upholding the value of virtue on the one hand, he also tried to accommodate the “common-sense” opinions that happiness also depends on conventional goods such as health and wealth. The result is inconsistency and a lack of clarity on key issues.
Stoicism, in contrast, was famous in antiquity for its tightly worked out principles and internal coherence. It was also famous for its moral rigor, which, Gill reports, modern moral theorists often find lacking in other forms of virtue ethics:
Moral rigour, in modern theory, is a quality associated more closely with theories other than virtue ethics or eudaimonism, for instance with Kantian deontology or (certain types of) Utilitarianism. Indeed, the idea of moral rigour (or ‘morality’, more broadly) has sometimes been regarded negatively by some modern virtue ethicists. However, Stoicism shows that ethical rigour can coherently form part of a virtue ethical and eudaimonistic framework and one that has other features characteristic of modern virtue ethics. In Stoic theory, this rigour consists in their central claim that only virtue (and virtue-based happiness, and other things dependent on virtue) count as good, that is, objects of value in the full sense.
p. 257
In addition to this internal coherence and moral rigor, Stoicism also provides “rich and inclusive (but also cohesive and unified) conceptions of both virtue and happiness,” as well as modern features such as “congenial pastimes and the emotion of joy” (p. 258). Plus, Stoicism has an interesting and robust stance on nature and the environment (which we will look at in detail in the next chapter). In other words, Stoicism has everything we need for a credible virtue ethics in the 21st century. What’s not to love?
Filling in the Gaps from Aristotelianism
That’s the high-level overview of what Stoicism can offer contemporary philosophy. However, Gill also looks in some detail at the specific points where Stoicism improves on Aristotelianism. The comparison is quite interesting, given that the two schools share some basic assumptions and important similarities:
Aristotle provides a broad framework, which holds good for much later ancient theory, including Stoicism, and which is also widely accepted by modern theorists of virtue ethics and eudaimonism working in an Aristotelian mode. This framework sets certain general criteria for what should count as happiness (eudaimonia), namely being complete, self-sufficient, and constituting the overall goal or end (telos) of a human life.
p. 262
These similarities would certainly be helpful in presenting Stoicism to any theorist who is already familiar with Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Let’s look now at some of the problems left unresolved by Aristotle, and how the Stoic decided to resolve them.
Relationship between virtue and happiness
“Following a finely balanced line of argument, [Aristotle] reaches the conclusion that happiness requires not just virtue but also an ‘adequate’ supply of external goods, and that throughout ‘a complete life’… The corollary is that happiness is no longer, straightforwardly, ‘according to virtue’; and Aristotle’s move introduces complication, and arguably, internal tension or ambiguity into his account of this relationship.” (p. 264)
As we have just spent the past two months discussing, Stoicism takes a very different approach to this question. Stoics firmly and unequivocally believe that internal virtue is necessary and sufficient for happiness. That means that bodily and external goods do not contribute to happiness, and their presence or absence does not impact happiness. While critics throughout the ages have attacked this doctrine as too demanding or unrealistic, the Stoics are clearly rigorous and consistent on this point.
Theoretical vs. practical wisdom
Aristotle suggests that “activity based on theoretical wisdom counts as the highest and most perfect form of happiness, whereas that based on ethical virtue combined with practical wisdom represents a lesser or secondary grade” (p. 266). This has the unfortunately elitist effect of making most common human activities suboptimal, elevating the purely philosophical life above more practical occupations. (Clearly Aristotle never had to take out the trash himself.)
The Stoics, fortunately, take a more egalitarian approach to the question of theory vs. practice. They insist that rather than worrying whether a life of theory or practice is better, we should focus on being rational:
In one source, their view is reported in this form: ‘There being three ways of life, the theoretical, the practical, and the rational (logikos), they say the third is to be chosen; the rational animal has been equipped (epitēdes) by nature for theory and action’. The Stoics refuse to treat the difference between the theoretical and practical lives as fundamental…Both spheres of activity are presented as being, in principle, appropriate ones for realizing our nature and, by implication, for achieving the happy life.
p. 271-272
Self/other relationships
Next, we consider a question that contemporary philosophers sometimes level against ancient virtue ethics—that a focus on eudaimonia is self-centered and excludes other-directed care. (This is sometimes expressed as a distinction between egoism and altruism.)
Modern virtue ethicists, as well as moral theorists of other types, sometimes object to giving (one’s own) happiness a central role in ethical theory at all, on the grounds that doing so implies an egoistic or self-centred standpoint which is antithetical to the overall objectives of ethics (or of ‘morality’, as it is sometimes put). (p. 274)
Aristotle’s work is sometimes seen as “foundationally egoistic” in this way, since he touches on this point but does not provide a complete response. In discussing friendship, for example, he indicates that a true friend wishes the other well for their own sake, which some scholars interpret as “an ideal of ‘altruistic’ friendship” (p. 276). Later, however, Aristotle goes on to say that the well-wisher is also benefiting himself: such a friendship enables him to live his best life (so to speak), thereby increasing his own happiness. In this line of thinking, altruism is ultimately self-directed, since it benefits the agent as much as the friend.
Gill suggests that Stoicism meets the altruism-egoism challenge better than Aristotelianism. The Stoic theory of happiness is more tightly bound to virtue, which (as we’ve seen in our recent study of oikeiosis) has a significant other-facing dimension. If you’ll recall from Chapter 4, the ancient Stoics posited two basic motives or instincts that drive human behavior: self-preservation (self-care) and affection for others (other-care). Through rational ethical development we cultivate both of these instincts. So Stoic ethics “is not characterized in terms of ‘self’ versus ‘others’; our concern for others as well as ourselves forms an integral part of our human nature as sociable as well as rational” (p. 277). No egoism here!
Conclusion
So where does that leave us with modern virtue ethics—does Stoicism get a chair around the table? Well, we’re not quite done with this conversation. In Chapter 7 (which we’ll cover next week) Gill introduces some additional ways in which Stoicism can contribute to the current discussion, particularly in reference to human nature and the natural world. So we will reserve a final thoughts for another post.
But personally, I do think Gill offers convincing arguments for how Stoicism equals and even improves on Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. He reminds us of Stoicism’s great strengths: its psychological holism, covering all aspects of the person and all aspects of a full life; its moral rigor, with both self-directed and other-directed care; its theoretical consistency and internal coherence, which provides practitioners with clear (if demanding) guidance. I don’t think any contemporary system of ethics can stand toe to toe with Stoicism in these respects.
Please join me next time as we turn our attention to “Stoic Ethics, Human Nature, and the Environment” in Chapter 7 of Learning to Live Naturally. See you then!