Responses to questions on Stoic ethics

Good and evil, fate and agency, the dichotomy of control, and more!

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Thank you to everyone who sent in questions about Stoic ethics! In honor of the one-year anniversary of our book Stoic Ethics: The Basics, Chris Gill and I are answering some of your questions this week. Below you’ll see the questions and our responses. Primary answers are provided by Chris (indicated by CG), with some practical examples added by me (BP). We hope this clarifies some tricky points from our book and inspires you to reflect on Stoicism and ethics.

Virtue and Indifferents

Q: We hear so much about the only thing in our control are our opinions, desires, choices, etc, and everything else is indifferent. At the extreme of this we get Stoic detachment where tragedy (or good things) unfold in our lives and we bear it virtuously and with good character, but don't act on events because it involves externals or indifferents. Is action that we take to affect our lives then dependent on preferred indifferents? Or, how exactly does virtue compel us to act when virtue seems to be an internal state that doesn't rely on the outcomes of our actions?

CG: Stoic ideas about the relationship between virtue and indifferents are quite complex but make good sense, when worked out (we have a full discussion of this in Ch. 2 of Stoic Ethics, esp. pp. 31-2). Human beings are naturally (and rightly) attracted by ‘preferred indifferents’ (e.g. life, health, property, family); but what really matters in life is not gaining these things but learning to select correctly (virtuously) between indifferents, both preferred and ‘dispreferred’ (e.g. death, illness, poverty, lack of family). Virtue is sometimes defined as ‘right choice’ of indifferents. It is virtuous choice of indifferents that counts as what is really ‘good’ and what brings genuine ‘happiness’ (eudaimonia). So although virtue and indifferents are sometimes sharply contrasted (only virtue is good, not preferred indifferents); they are also interdependent. You cannot just be virtuous in the void, so to speak (in this sense it is not just an ‘internal state’, as you put it): virtue consists in dealing properly with indifferents. But virtue is not dependent on outcomes in the sense of being dependent wholly on worldly success. i.e. gaining preferred indifferents, but on doing so in a virtuous way.

This rather complex picture does not come out very clearly in Epictetus, who draws a strong contrast between what is ‘up to us’ and ‘externals’. Epictetus’s contrast is a useful corrective to the common tendency to think that ‘preferred indifferents’ are good (e.g. the richer I am, the happier I am). But it is useful to look at other Stoic sources (e.g. Cicero, On Ends Book 3) to get a fuller picture of the Stoic ideas on this, as we do in our ch. 2.

BP: Virtue does require action in the world, so it would not be accurate to say that Stoics “don't act on events because they involve externals or indifferents.” We do act on externals and indifferents—that is the stuff of our lives—but we don’t believe that our happiness depends on those things. And because of this belief, we act differently than we we would if we believed our happiness depended on them. The indifferents of life are material for our choices, and it’s up to us to use them well and make good choices.

To provide a simple analogy, we might think of an artist creating a painting. If the artist is highly skilled—a virtuoso—she can create a masterpiece with any kind of paints. She brings her skill (virtue) as a painter to the raw materials (canvas and paints) to make something beautiful. She needs the paints in order to create, but her skill in painting does not depend on them. Likewise, in life (which the Stoics described as the art of living) we apply our own skill (virtue) to the raw materials we are given (indifferents). It’s up to us to turn our lives into something beautiful.

Good and Evil

Q: I would love some clarification on the Stoic view of evil and what should be done about it. We know virtue is the only good, and so vice is the only evil. Still, Stoicism asserts that people only choose vice because of ignorance of the true good. What then is the Stoic response to evil acts of others? Forgive and forget? Dismiss it because it is all external and indifferent? Or do we act against evil according to our respective roles in life?

CG: You are right that Stoics think wrongdoing is a product of ignorance (ignorance of what is really good or bad, as in the response to your first question). So how should we respond? Epictetus and Marcus discuss this point often (see e.g. Epictetus, Discourses 1.28.8-9). Yes, we should forgive or pity rather than being angry. But we should also try to educate and change the beliefs of those who are doing wrong and lead them towards a better understanding of what really matters. We certainly should not just dismiss bad actions as unimportant – after all they are bad, and so in conflict with virtue. We should work on what is within our power (Epictetus is right about this, at least) and both try to act rightly and persuade others to do the same, as far as we can. And, yes, we should take into account our role in life and work towards right (virtuous) action within our specific social context and situation (Cicero has a very good discussion of roles in On Duties 1.107-15).

BP: Yes, the Stoics advocate compassion and nonretaliation toward wrongdoers, but that is not the same as nonaction. It’s important to respond to and also try to prevent harmful and unhealthy actions committed by other people—even if we believe those actions are caused by ignorance. In practice, that means implementing rules and legal codes, and/or meting out just punishments. On a personal level, we are better off forgiving those who wrong us, but that doesn’t mean we ignore the detrimental consequences of their actions. We want to encourage a flourishing society, and this means holding people accountable for what they do.

The important thing to note here is the attitude with which we hold people accountable: we can implement justice while showing compassion to wrongdoers. We want to maintain our personal integrity and cultivate a rational and compassionate attitude that allows us to deal with difficult people justly and effectively.

Fate and Agency

Q: This goes a bit beyond ethics, but the ancient Stoics believed that everything is fated or pre-determined. If that is the case, to what extent do humans have agency and the ability to steer the course of our lives and why bother trying?

CG: The Stoic position is clear but again quite complex. Their position is not ‘fatalism’ or ‘free will’ as ordinarily understood in modern discussion. They are ‘compatibilists’, in modern terms, who believe that free will, or at least rational agency, is compatible with a determinist worldview. All events form part of a seamless web of causes: there are no purely random or causeless events. But human beings – and human choices – form an integral part of this seamless web. And human choice (unlike the actions of other animals) involves rationality, the use of the critical faculty, and agency. In this sense human action is ‘autonomous’ and carries with it responsibility for one’s choices. We do not, on the Stoic view, make choices randomly or arbitrarily: our choices reflect our characters, our situation in life, our upbringing and context (we are part of the seamless web of causes). But because we are rational animals we are not just ‘dragged along’ by events or by ‘fate’ but are choosing agents. Hence, Epictetus’ stress on what is ‘up to us’ (look at Discourses 1.17), even though he sometimes, misleadingly, suggests we are ‘dragged along’ by fate, because we are part of a larger web of events.

Helping a Homeless Man

Q: I've been helping a homeless man in a local coffee shop I frequent in the afternoon. Every time I'm in, he’s watching videos on a tablet. Employees say he arrives shortly after opening and leaves just before closing. He is of sound mind and body. He appears to be in his mid-40s and able to work, with no sign of drugs or abuse of alcohol. The support I give is modest: clothes that were going to Goodwill, a small gift card from the establishment, and rewards from the same shop that I wasn't going to use before expiration. My question is: Am I condoning bad behavior?

BP: I’m assuming your question revolves around the fact that by supporting this man, you might be encouraging him not to work. I think that’s a legitimate point to consider, but I don’t think you are acting unethically by giving him food and clothes. (There would be a much higher bar if you were giving him cash.) We don’t know what led him to his current jobless and homeless condition—perhaps he was simply unfortunate—and there is certainly nothing wrong with helping people who are down on their luck. If new information comes to light that he is misusing your gifts, then it would be virtuous to discontinue the gifts. Or if he feels insulted by your assumption that he needs help, then perhaps it would be best to discontinue. Otherwise, I see no reason why a few gifts in kind would be condoning bad behavior.

Control and Virtue

Q: Does focus on what you can control mean to choose the right virtue for any given situation?

CG: I think this is roughly right but there are a few qualifications. First, the Stoics think that human beings (apart from the ideal ‘sage’ or wise person) are not fully virtuous but are, potentially at least, ‘making progress’ toward virtue. So we need to do what is within our power to make progress towards virtue and do so in a way that responds appropriately to the situation we find ourselves in. Secondly, the Stoics believe in ‘the unity of virtue’ (Stoic Ethics, pp. 16-17), that is, they believe that the virtues are unified or interdependent. So acting on any given virtue depends on bringing the virtues together: we cannot be properly brave unless we are also just, moderate, and wise, for instance. So even if, in a given situation, what we need to do is, primarily, to act bravely, this also depends on developing good judgement (wisdom) and an understanding of how to treat other people properly (justice), and proper management of our emotions and desires (temperance or moderation). So, even while accentuating one virtue in a specific situation, we need also to work towards developing the virtues as a whole. Also, the Stoics see virtue as a form of knowledge or expertise that we need to build up gradually so we can respond appropriately in any one situation.

BP: Virtue is related to focusing on what you can control. The Stoics believed that a good life does not depend on external things, such as acquiring wealth or being liked by other people. We live a truly happy and meaningful life when we focus on what really matters: being wise and courageous, cultivating love and goodwill, making the best of things. The things that really make for a good life are within our control, so we should focus on those. Everything else is outside of our control, and since those things don’t lead to a truly good life anyway, we shouldn’t waste our attention and energy on seeking those external things.

So yes, you could say that focusing on what you can control means choosing virtue in every situation. There’s a really wonderful quote from Epictetus that encapsulates this idea well. He is talking with a student who is complaining that “unpleasant and distressing things come about in this life.” Epictetus reminds him,

Haven’t you been endowed with faculties that enable you to bear whatever may come about? Haven’t you been endowed with greatness of soul? And with courage? And with endurance? If only I have greatness of soul, what reason is left for me to be worried about things that may come to pass? What can disconcert or trouble me, or seem in any way distressing?

Discourses, 1.6, 26-29

In other words, when facing life’s inevitable challenges, it can be helpful to focus on what personal strengths you can bring to the situation. As Epictetus puts it (1.6, 43), you have within you “the resources and equipment that are needed to be noble-minded and courageous.”

Duties as a Soldier

Q: Is taking another’s life as part of battle during military service acceptable? Under what circumstances, and can it even be virtuous?

CG: The ancient Stoics do not actually discuss this question specifically, as far as I am aware, but they do have theories which we can draw on to help to work out what their view would be. One such theory is the idea of the four roles (Cicero, On Duties 1.107-15) which fits in with other Stoic ethical ideas. Our first and primary role is that of being a human being, rational and sociable and potentially virtuous. The second role is that of exercising our distinctive personal talents and inclinations and the third is acting in line with our social role. The key point is that we should aim to bring the performance of these roles together and make them consistent. So we should aim to ensure that playing our social role is consistent with aiming to act rightly, and to work towards acting virtuously. We should aim to play our ‘human’ role as well as our social role more narrowly understood.

Military service is one such social role. So in principle we should act in a way that is appropriate for this role, and this means that we may have to kill others (and avoid being killed ourselves as well as defending our fellow-soldiers) in appropriate situations. However, this does not mean the Stoics would endorse killing others in a random or unconsidered way. They would expect an individual soldier (and of course the commanders and politicians ordering military action) to observe internationally recognized rules of warfare, such as the Geneva conventions, on matters such as avoiding killing civilians, especially women and children, and killing only where necessary as part of a military operation with a clearly specified set of objectives and limits. The Stoics believe in the unity of virtue (see an earlier response), so courage needs to be consistent with justice, wisdom and moderation, otherwise it does not count as courage. Courage needs to be well-judged, and to express justice to all those involved (including the enemy), and in line with good judgement (wisdom) and to express proper emotional self-management (not killing for emotional self-satisfaction).

By the same token, the Stoics would also stress the importance of the overall military objective (or the objective of any given operation) being consistent with sound moral principles. Otherwise, the collective action being taken is not consistent with the overall human role of exercising the virtues. So if a soldier concludes that he is being ordered to carry out actions (including killing) in an operation that, in his judgement, is not properly justified or is indeed in clear contradiction to internationally recognized rules or conventions of warfare, then the act of killing is not, in Stoic terms, right or virtuous but wrong. There are many examples of Roman Stoics concluding that for them to play the role of a senator or adviser to an emperor properly they have to reject the orders of a corrupt emperor or remove themselves from the normal context of the role (they must walk out of the senate, for instance) or go into exile rather than act wrongly in obedience to the corrupt emperor (see Epictetus, Discourses 1.1,1.2).

So, although the normal Stoic view is that you should play your social role appropriately (i.e. for a soldier fight and kill where necessary), the Stoics would also endorse the actions of someone who decides on good grounds that the military operation he is engaged in is wrong and unjustified and that he should not play this role. So Stoicism can justify being a conscientious objector or a refuser, where the soldier concludes on careful and considered reflection and good grounds that the action he is being ordered to carry out is unjustified. I hope these comments are helpful on this morally difficult and complex question.

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