On Toleration

Why Stoics say we should tolerate people and opinions we disagree with

Recognizing the fact that the judgments of others are not up to us…does not mean that we should cease engaging with those with whom we disagree. As Marcus makes explicit throughout the Meditations,…it does not mean that we ought to refrain from attempting to teach, persuade and instruct those whom we think have made errors of judgment. It does entail, however, that we do so with gentleness, kindness, and goodwill, and that we persist in this disposition towards others even if we fail to persuade them. Living well involves acting neither like a tyrant nor slave, neither as one who seeks to dominate nor as one who is dominated; it involves living neither in dependence of others nor cut off from them.

John Lombardini, The Stoic Virtue of Toleration

Would you be surprised to learn that the Stoics invented the idea of toleration? If you’re at all familiar with Stoicism, you’ll know that the ancient Stoics were always talking about bearing with other people and having compassion for those who err—so it might not really surprise you to discover that the first philosophical use of tolerantia is associated with Stoicisim. As classicist John Lombardini points out in his excellent article “Stoicism and the Virtue of Toleration,” the term was introduced by Cicero in Stoic Paradoxes to explain the Stoic doctrine of enduring difficulties. (Seneca also lists tolerantia as a virtue of endurance, quite similar to the way in which we might speak of tolerating pain or annoyance.) However, it’s in a different sense—that of social forbearance—that Stoic toleration is most important in our social and civic lives. This is the theme we will explore today, courtesy of Lombardini’s very interesting article.

Lombardini suggests that the Stoic ideal of social (and by extension civic and political) toleration is most fully developed in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, but it originated with the earlier Stoic conception of tolerance as enduring unpleasant things that happen to you. Epictetus simply needed to give the concept a new spin order to extend this forbearance to the people around you who do things you don’t like or don’t agree with. This, in turn, has very important consequences for our social and political norms:

These conceptions of toleration as a personal and social virtue do address key issues that are important to any political conception of toleration; namely, they address not only what practices and beliefs the state ought to tolerate, but why individual citizens ought to tolerate such practices, and how it is that such citizens might cultivate the beliefs and social practices connected with toleration as a political principle (Lombardini, p. 645)

The article is quite detailed and I can’t take you through every step here, so I would encourage you to read the full piece for yourself. But I will cover the highlights here and conclude by suggesting that Stoicism can serve as a bolster to principles of free expression that are currently under siege in Western societies. And if you’re interested in this topic, please register for Stoicon 2025, where our theme is engaged citizenship and we will be discussing this and similar important issues.

Toleration as Enduring Unpleasant Things

As mentioned above, the classic Stoic conception of toleration originated with endurance. This is one of the more well-known aspects of Stoicism, going all the way back to Zeno but exemplified by the Roman Stoics. Musonius Rufus, for example, says that “the person educated correctly, whoever it be, whether male or female, must become accustomed to endure toil, to not fear death, and to not become dejected in the face of any misfortune” (Lectures, 4.7), while Seneca says things like “[The wise person] endures all things just as he endures a numbing winter and bad weather in the skies, just as he endures fevers and illnesses and other things happen by chance” (On the Constancy of the Wise Person, 9.1).

Epictetus also used toleration in this sense, but he extended it into the social sphere as well. Lombardini cites Discourses 2.12 and 4.5, in which Epictetus attributes social endurance to his role model Socrates:

It was the principal and most distinctive characteristic of Socrates that he never got overheated in an argument, and never resorted to abuse or any form of insolence, but would patiently endure abuse from others and put an end to any conflict. (2.12, 14)

A virtuous or good person neither quarrels with anyone, nor, so far as he can, does he allow anyone else to quarrel. In this matter, as in so much else, an example is set for us in the life of Socrates, who not only made a consistent habit of avoiding quarrels for his own part, but also tried to prevent others from quarreling…For he kept the thought firmly fixed in his mind that no one can exert control over another person's ruling center; and he thus wanted nothing that was not truly his own. And what is that? It is not that we should try to make some other person act in accordance with this nature, because that is not within our power, but that while other people are attending to their affairs as they think best, he himself should act nonetheless in accordance with nature and continue to do so, attending to his own business alone in such a way that others too may be in accord with nature. (4.5, 1-7)

In this way Epictetus suggests that other people’s bad actions and incorrect opinions are one of the things in life we must endure or tolerate. If we want to live a good life, we must tolerate social pains just as we do physical pains. We shouldn’t allow any of this to overthrow our own prohairesis (moral choice) and ability to be happy.

At the same time, these passages reveal that Epictetus recognized one person cannot compel another person to believe something, since each human has their own rationality. Many tyrants have tried to compel people to believe certain things, but the Stoics (in the tradition of Socrates) thought that it’s impossible to force beliefs onto another person. Someone might pretend to believe something in order to fit in or save themselves from persecution, but you can’t truly force someone to believe. Beliefs are one of the few things that are ultimately up to the individual. It is therefore contrary to nature for one person to attempt to compel belief.

Marcus Aurelius, taking Epictetus’ idea one step further, explicitly links toleration with social virtue. As Lombardini notes, “while Zeno, Chrysippus and Seneca all discuss endurance in connection with the virtue of courage, Marcus argues that endurance is part of justice” (p. 656). For Marcus, not only is putting up with other people a way to secure your own happiness, but it is what we owe to other humans in virtue of their rationality. In passages such as Meditations 5.20, Marcus proposes that “human beings are the beings who are closest to us, in so far as we must do good to our fellows and show them tolerance.” By bearing with an annoying or malicious person, we are not only enduring a challenge courageously for our own sake, but also treating a fellow human appropriately. Toleration becomes not merely a personal (or as Lombardini puts it, “self-regarding”) virtue, but is also a social (or “other-regarding”) virtue. Lombardini summarizes Marcus’ essential point very succinctly:

We can, and ought to, object to the judgments of others that we find objectionable; yet we must also accept that their judgments are not up to us, that they are equally endowed with a share of divine logos, and that, because of this, they are free to judge for themselves (in the sense that their judgments are ultimately up to them), whatever the outcome of that process; and that recognition requires that we treat other human beings with kindness and with toleration. (p. 660)

Toleration Toward Those We Disagree With

The Stoics have a very clear conception of virtue and vice, or otherwise put, of what leads to flourishing for an individual and society. However, they recognize that not everyone shares their beliefs, and that humans—as rational agents—have the right to hold false, illusory, and/or unhealthy beliefs. Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus explain clearly that we can and should use rational persuasion to convince people that virtue is in their best interest. But they also acknowledge that it’s impossible to convince everyone, and that we must inevitably put up with people who hold very different beliefs from ourselves.

Lombardini suggests that this bi-directional attitude of tolerance (toward the self in the form of courageous endurance and toward others in the form of justice) can be viewed as one of the earliest doctrines of political toleration. The position of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius prefigures the notion of tolerance in the work of Enlightenment philosophers such as Locke and Kant, preparing the way for modern theories of toleration that form the bedrock of our political systems today:

This combination of self-regarding and other-regarding dimensions of toleration makes the Stoic conception somewhat unique. There are elements of the Stoic conception of toleration that appear to anticipate later developments: for example, the Stoic insistence that the beliefs of others are ultimately up to them might be viewed as anticipating Locke’s argument in A Letter Concerning Toleration that religious belief cannot be compelled; and the focus on our shared rationality might be viewed as anticipating certain Kantian and neo-Kantian approaches to toleration. (p. 669)

(If you read my post on self-respect from last year, this will sound very familiar.)

Personally, I think the sincere practice of Stoicism can guide us toward norms of discourse and conduct in which persuasion, not coercion, is the valued mode of shaping society. Speech and ideas travel faster and farther today than they ever have before, and it’s inevitable that in a free society some of those ideas will be bad. Such is the nature of things. The proper response is not to threaten people, kill them, or take away their right to espouse opinions that we (or those who hold political or social power) disagree with. The proper response is to show why they are wrong and change their minds.

It’s rather amazing that Marcus Aurelius—who, as Roman Emperor, could have imprisoned or even killed people who threatened him politically—chose instead to tolerate them. These were not just idle words for Marcus; he practiced them routinely throughout his reign. (Of course, we all know what happened when Commodus took over: no more toleration.) Living in the imperial era, all the Roman Stoics had to deal with the lack of toleration the emperor typically displayed. Many philosophers, such as Musonius, were exiled, and some, such as Seneca, were disposed of. Reading Epictetus’ Discourses reminds us of the general fear that most people had of the emperor—one wrong word could mean death, torture, or loss of property.

Marcus Aurelius was obviously aware of the intolerance most of his imperial predecessors displayed, and he consciously worked to be like the best of them (Antoninus Pius) rather than the worst. But even Marcus couldn’t have dreamed of the types of toleration we have today, which depend not on the virtue of a particular person but which are enshrined within the polity itself. This form of toleration is certainly not the default or norm in political systems; it is both fragile and well worth protecting.

Concluding Thoughts

Lombardini concludes with the quintessentially Stoic recommendation that we learn toleration by practicing it: we “need to engage critically with others in order to learn how to endure the discomfort that often accompanies being confronted by disagreement and difference” (p. 669). In this way, learning to tolerate the opinions of other people—especially those with whom you disagree—is a type of askesis (exercise), just like learning to tolerate other types of physical and emotional irritation. This doesn’t come naturally to most people, and therefore it has to be assiduously cultivated through cultural expectations and training.

Toleration is obviously a huge topic, one that touches on many different debates raging throughout our societies today. We have barely scratched the surface here, but we will continue this discussion at Stoicon on October 18. For now, I hope it’s clear that Stoicism has much to offer in this conversation, especially since the concept grew out of ancient Stoic ideas. Let’s close with a wonderful line on toleration from Marcus Aurelius (Meditations, 8.59):

Human beings have come into the world for the sake of one another; either instruct them, then, or put up with them.

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Photo credit: Priscilla du Preez